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THE PRESENT PAPER confronts the general question of the lawfulness1 
of forestalling both potential owners from originally appropriating unowned 
land and actual owners from exiting their property. This kind of forestalling, 
which poses problems for libertarian theory, consists in a pattern of 
appropriation that allegedly puts a given individual in such a position that it is 
impossible for him to appropriate an unowned tract of land or to exit his 
property without trespass. In the libertarian literature, forestalling has been a 
subject of discussion for a long time. For instance, Nozick (2014, p. 55) 
identified the “possibility of surrounding an individual” as “a difficulty for a 
libertarian theory that contemplates private ownership of all roads and 
streets, with no public ways of access.” For van Dun (2009), the problem of 
encirclement reflects a fundamental tension between freedom and property 
within libertarian theory, and stems from the absolute character of the latter. 
He proposes “the free movement proviso” as a way out of the encirclement 
problem, although the “proviso is a far-reaching restriction of the property 
right of route owners as it would be defined according to the ‘freedom as 
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1 By “lawful” I mean in accordance with the principles of justice, whether or not 
these principles are recognized by a given legal system. 
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property’ conception” (p. 234). In turn, according to Rothbard, anyone who 
“uses violence to prevent another settler from entering upon this never-used 
land and transforming it into use” is a “criminal aggressor” (Rothbard, 2002, 
p. 64).2 
As the above quotations indicate, the problem of forestalling is 
connected with many important social issues of interest for libertarian 
scholarship. For instance, it serves as one of the arguments raised against the 
idea of private ownership of roads, as, for example, in the case of Tullock, 
according to whom “if you had private and total ownership of roads, it would 
be possible to purchase all of the houses around a given plot of land” and 
then “collect the full rental value of the enclosed land” (1996, p. 590). The 
possibility of forestalling might even suggest that the whole project of full 
privatization of roads is doubtful since, as pointed out by Nozick, “anyone 
can be surrounded by enemies who cast their nets widely enough” and 
therefore there always “remains the question of ‘exit to where?’” (2014, p. 
55). For the same reasons, forestalling is also an important consideration in 
the context of migration. The answer to the question about how the 
movement of people would look in an anarcho-capitalist society and whether 
“the free movement proviso” would lead to “a far-reaching restriction of the 
property right” (van Dun, 2009, p. 234) or even that “no such thing as 
freedom of immigration would exist” (Hoppe, 2001, p. 139) partially depends 
on whether it is lawful or unlawful to forestall. In the case of children’s rights, 
the thesis that it is impermissible to forestall has been proposed as an 
explanation for requirements placed on parents to inform potential guardians 
                                                          
2 The present paper understands original appropriation as acquiring property rights 
to unowned things. Such first acquisitions happen through some investitive facts “or 
processes, by which unheld things may come to be held” (Nozick, 1974, p. 150) identified 
differently by different theories of justice in first acquisition. In the context of the present 
discussion one can point to two main theories of this kind: Lockean labor theory (e.g., 
Locke, 1980; Rothbard, 1998; Block, 2008) and Roman first possession or occupancy 
theory (e.g., Epstein, 1979; Kinsella, 2008). The former theory identifies mixing one’s 
labor with a thing as the investitive fact by which property rights to unowned things may 
be acquired. The latter sees it as taking first possession of a thing. Mixing one’s labor as 
the investitive fact by which original appropriation may be effectuated is in turn 
understood by the present paper as homesteading (Rothbard, 1998; Block, 2008). 
Therefore the principle of justice in first acquisition is identified here as the homestead 
principle. However, it is important to notice that the line of argument presented in this 
paper is also valid on the alternative principle of justice in first acquisition espoused for 
instance by Kinsella (Kinsella, 2008, p. 38), according to whom not mixing one’s labor 
with a thing but first possession or occupancy constitutes the investitive fact. 
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about abandoning children without resorting to the concept of positive duty 
(Block, 2004).  
Besides the aforementioned links between the forestalling problem and 
sundry issues vividly debated within libertarianism, the question of 
forestalling plays a fundamental role in the theory of property rights. As I will 
demonstrate, whether forestalling is lawful or unlawful determines one’s 
conception of natural property rights. Since, as I will argue, allowing 
forestalling leads to “incompossible duties and rights” (Steiner, 1994, p. 82), 
one’s conception of natural property rights cannot accommodate the 
Hoppean idea of property rights as conflict-avoiding norms (Hoppe, 2010, 
pp. 18–19; 2006, p. 319; Kinsella, 2008, p. 29). What is more, one’s 
conception of natural property rights cannot treat them as rationally justified 
norms because nothing that runs against the law of non-contradiction can be 
rationally justified (Łukasiewicz, 1987, p. 172; 1988, pp. 108–09). For all these 
reasons, the problem of forestalling is crucial for a libertarian theory of rights. 
Block (1977; 1978; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2008; 2010a; 
2010b; 2011; 2016) proposed a solution to the forestalling problem that 
points out that the impermissibility of forestalling stems from the logic of the 
homestead principle. He claims this impermissibility “is an implication of the 
logic of homesteading. Part and parcel of this doctrine is the notion that it is 
illicit to control land that was not homesteaded” (2010b; emphasis in original). 
Allowing for forestalling would then be “anathema to the libertarian ideal 
that all of the earth’s surface should come under private ownership” (Block, 
2016, p. 29). This idea that forestalling violates the homestead principle and 
therefore that it is impossible to appropriate land in such a way as to forestall 
others from appropriating an unowned land or from exiting already 
appropriated land has been called by Kinsella the “Blockian Proviso” 
(Kinsella, 2007; Block, 2010b). Block (2010b) explained this idea as follows: 
Picture a bagel (or donut) with a hole in it. Label the hole in the 
center as ‘A,’ the bagel itself as ‘B’ and the surrounding territory, 
lying outside of the bagel, as ‘C.’ Suppose that someone, call him 
Mr. B, homesteads the land depicted by B. Assume away any 
possibility of tunneling under, or bridging or flying a helicopter over 
this terrain, B. Mr. B, then, controls area A, without ever having 
lifted a finger in the direction of homesteading this land, A. Yes, as 
of now, Mr. B does not own A. But, under our assumptions, he can 
homestead this territory whenever he wants to do so. Mr. B and [sic] 
gained an untoward advantage, vis-à-vis all other potential 
homesteaders of A, who are now residing in territory C, and cannot 
reach A, without trespassing on B, Mr. B’s property. This, I claim, is 
incompatible with the logic of homesteading. 
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The main purpose of this paper is to provide an original justification 
for the Blockian Proviso and to defend it against its critics, particularly 
Kinsella (2007; 2009). Instead of drawing directly on Block’s idea that 
“libertarianism abhors a property vacuum” (Long, 2007), I argue that the 
Blockian Proviso is in fact a rationality requirement placed on any system of 
property rights that aspires to be a justified system of rights, and if Kinsella 
and other critics of the Blockian Proviso want to abandon it, they will end up 
with a system of contradictory and therefore irrational rights. In the process 
of supporting the Blockian Proviso against its critics, I deliver my 
interpretation of this powerful logical device, viewing it as an indispensable 
part of the homestead principle of justice in first acquisition and as equivalent 
to the law of non-contradiction in the theory of just property rights. 
2. Setting the Stage for the Blockian Proviso 
I will commence by articulating two important introductory points so 
that we may proceed more smoothly later on. First, according to Hoppe, 
libertarianism endorses a “theory of property as a set of rulings applicable to 
all goods, with the goal of helping to avoid all possible conflicts by means of 
uniform principles” (Hoppe, 2006, p. 319). Natural property rights, which are 
understood as “those claims a person has to legal enforcement that are 
justified, on balance, by the full constellation of relevant reasons, whether or 
not they are actually recognized and enforced by a legal system” (Barnett, 
2004, p. 16), and which hold the latter “up to the unsparing and unyielding 
light of reason” (Rothbard, 2002, p. 17), must avoid conflicts or they will not 
be natural property rights—rationally justified claims—since consistency is 
the necessary condition for any rational justification. 
Regardless of what the other characteristics of natural property rights 
are and which rights are actually rational and just, one thing is beyond doubt: 
no system of rights that runs against the law of non-contradiction can fit the 
bill. From the purely conceptual point of view, rationally justified rights 
cannot be contradictory. It is exactly this necessary condition that the 
Blockian Proviso imposes on a system of rights in order to filter out irrational 
and unjust rights. As Steiner emphasizes, “mutual consistency—or 
compossibility—of all the rights in a proposed set of rights is at least a necessary 
condition of that set being a possible one… Any justice principle that delivers 
a set of rights yielding contradictory judgements about permissibility of a 
particular action is unrealizable” (1994, pp. 2–3). For all these reasons, Hoppe 
points out that “the ‘natural law’ character” of the libertarian theory of 
property rights consists in “the avoidance of conflict regarding the use of 
scarce physical things” and that therefore “conflict-generating norms 
contradict the very purpose of norms” (2012, p. 15). What is particularly 
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important from the point of view of this paper is that Kinsella, who criticizes 
the Blockian Proviso, espouses the above theory of property rights and 
successfully uses it in his critique of intellectual property. As he explicitly 
states, “the fundamental social and ethical function of property rights is to 
prevent interpersonal conflict over scarce resources” (2008, p. 29). Yet, as I 
will demonstrate below, one cannot consistently endorse this theory of 
property rights and at the same time reject the Blockian Proviso, which serves 
the law of non-contradiction in the theory of property rights.3 
                                                          
3 An anonymous reviewer remarks that, “The paper puts much emphasis on claiming 
that contradictory rights are irrational rights. It can be said that there are other paradigms 
in ethics, e.g. one can adhere to values as a source of ethical norms—e.g. one can argue 
that life is the most important value and there is no contradiction in respecting life, even 
if it implies situation/contextual ethics (as opposed to formalistic ethics like Kantian) 
derived, for example, from virtue ethics and where there would still be a place for 
objective and solid ethics, though norms would be based on values, and not on rights.” It 
is true that the present paper puts much emphasis on rejecting contradictory rights as 
unjustified, irrational, or impossible. This is what my interpretation of the Blockian 
Proviso is about and what I strongly endorse. Yet I do not deny that there can also be 
valid situational or other ethics based on values or virtues. To the contrary, I agree with 
the reviewer, and I want to explain that the position I propose actually presupposes that 
there are other ethical considerations such as values or virtues. Only because of this 
pluralism of ethical paradigms and values can rights be invoked in the first place. What I 
claim is this: if people disagree about their values and ends, only then are property rights 
needed and only then do property rights allow people to avoid transforming these ethical 
disagreements into conflicts by unequivocally distributing physical resources or spheres of 
individual jurisdictions. When rights are contradictory, they are unable to perform this 
function (besides the fact that they cannot then be rationally justified). If people agreed 
about their values and universal harmony between people existed, property rights would 
be redundant. On the other hand, the question of contradictory norms, so pronounced in 
the case of conflict-avoiding rights, is less vital in the case of other kinds of norms 
concerning, for example, moral values or virtues that are considered from the internal 
perspective rather than from the vantage point of external relations among individuals. 
The present paper does not deny this. It focuses on the narrow question of rights, and in 
any place where it refers to norms, it means only one kind of norm: rights. What is more, 
I am also aware of other accounts of rights that depict them as mainly conducive to 
happiness or virtue rather than as needed to avoid conflicts, as well as accounts for which 
the question of contradictions may therefore be less explicit (though it can never be 
completely ignored). 
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The second preliminary point is to make explicit what having a right 
means, regardless of whether this right is natural or legal (Kramer, 2002, p. 8). 
Following Hohfeld (1913; 1917), we can say that 
1) person A has a right toward person B that person B not do X if and 
only if person B has a duty toward person A not to do X;  
2) person A has a right toward person B that person B does X if and only 
if person B has a duty toward person A to do X; 
3) person B has no duty toward person A not to do X if and only if person B 
has a liberty toward person A to do X; and 
4) person B has no duty toward person A to do X if and only if person B has 
a liberty toward person A not to do X.4 
3. Defending the Blockian Proviso 
We are now ready to deal with the merits of the Blockian Proviso in 
action as well as with the critiques that have been issued against it. We know 
the Blockian Proviso says that one may not homestead in such a way as to 
forestall potential owners from appropriating unowned land. As in the above 
quotation, Block depicted such a pattern of homesteading for heuristic 
purposes as a bagel or donut, although other shapes are illustrative as well—
for example, a torus. Although the Blockian Proviso excludes such bagel-
shaped appropriations, I will start my argument with a false assumption. 
Imagine a bagel-shaped plot of appropriated land. Assume Red owns this 
bagel-shaped plot, called A, B is an unappropriated hole-in-the-bagel plot of 







Figure 1: Hypothetical distribution of appropriated and unappropriated land. 
                                                          
4 For libertarian accounts of rights that explicitly embrace the Hohfeldian idea of 
“correlativity” of rights and duties, see, for instance, Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991, p. 81; 
Narveson, 2001, pp. 43–46; Steiner, 1994, p. 59. 
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Now we can ask: what does all this mean for Red’s and Blue’s property 
rights? Allow me to restate what it means to have a right. Red has a right 
toward Blue that Blue not do X if and only if Blue has a duty toward Red not 
to do X. In the bagel case, the following conclusions must therefore be true:  
1) because Red is not the owner of B and therefore does not have any 
rights to B, Blue by definition cannot have any correlative duties toward 
Red in connection with B; 
2) because Blue has no correlative duties toward Red in connection with B, 
Blue also has no duty toward Red not to enter B. 
But 
3) because Red is the owner of A, Blue has all correlative duties toward 
Red in connection with A; 
4) because Blue has all correlative duties toward Red in connection with A, 
Blue also has a duty toward Red not to enter A; 
5) because Blue has a duty toward Red not to enter A, he therefore has a 
duty toward Red not to cross A; 
6) because of the bagel-shape of the land, to cross A is to enter B;  
7) because Blue has a duty toward Red not to cross A and to cross A is to 
enter B, Blue has a duty toward Red not to enter B, which contradicts (2). 
As we can now see based on our false assumption, Blue at the same 
time would have no duty toward Red not to enter B and would have a duty 
toward Red not to enter B. Correlatively, Red would have no right toward 
Blue that Blue not enter B and Red would have a right toward Blue that Blue 
not enter B, which is plainly a logical contradiction.5 This is, of course, a 
devastating conclusion for anyone whose ambition is to identify just, rational, 
and conflict-avoiding rights, because here we have the very opposite. Hence, 
if we talk about just and rational rights, bagel-shaped appropriation is 
impossible, and therefore the Blockian Proviso, which negates the possibility 
of bagel-shaped appropriation, must be correct. One may not justly 
appropriate the bagel. Otherwise, contradiction- and conflict-generating 
norms appear, and as we know, “conflict-generating norms contradict the 
very purpose of norms” (Hoppe, 2012, p. 15). So, either we have the 
                                                          
5 Of course the same argument refers also to this kind of criticism issued against the 
Blockian Proviso, which talks about all other alleged duties and rights that could stem 
from the bagel-shaped appropriation as for instance rights to “collect the full rental value 
of the enclosed land” (Tullock, 1996, p. 590). 
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Blockian Proviso and just rights or we have contradiction and conflict. No 
third possibility is available to us. 
On the basis of our main, aforementioned argument, it is immediately 
apparent that the Blockian Proviso is not an add-on to the homestead 
principle but is logically consistent with its very core. It is good to keep in 
mind that the homestead principle is a principle of justice in first acquisition, 
not a technical procedure for fencing and cultivating land. Its purpose is to 
generate just and justified rights, not fancy geometrical patterns of land 
possession. Hence, as a principle of justice it cannot generate contradictory 
and conflicting rights because this would run against the very purpose of a 
principle of justice. But the homestead principle without the Blockian 
Proviso would do just this: generate contradictions. The Blockian Proviso is 
then a logical device that lets the homestead principle of justice do what it is 
supposed to do: distribute just and conflict-avoiding original property titles. 
This point is crucial since it elucidates the situations in which the Blockian 
Proviso operates. The Blockian Proviso works as part of the very 
philosophical basis of original appropriation and determines what may and 
what may not be first appropriated—namely, bagel-shaped land may not be 
appropriated. I will now show how this argument functions in the context of 
Kinsella’s criticism of the Blockian Proviso. 
Kinsella (2007) writes: 
Let’s imagine a rectangular island with 3 people: A, B, and C. B 
owns the middle stripe, A and C own the pieces on the ends. 
Suppose A wants to visit C. He has to cross B’s property. He has a 
right to visit C, if C invites him, and if he has a means of getting 
there. But he has no means of getting there. So? I assume Block 
would agree with me in this above example—that A has no 
easement over B’s property; that he can only visit C if B permits him 
to. But in Block’s theory, if C dies, all of a sudden this confers to A 
an easement-over-B’s-land! How can this be? 
The answer to this question lies in Kinsella’s own assumptions. The 






Figure 2: Kinsella’s hypothetical distribution of land shares. 
A B C 
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First, Kinsella assumes that, according to the Blockian Proviso (“I 
assume Block would agree with me”), even though A has no other means of 
getting onto C’s property than by crossing B’s land, “A has no easement over 
B’s property.” This, in turn, assumes B might have homesteaded the middle 
stripe in such a way as to effectively prevent A from getting into C’s land in 
the first place. Yet how can we know that if not by consulting our 
compossibility test? B might have homesteaded his stripe only if doing so 
would not generate contradictory and unjustified rights. Otherwise we would 
end up with conflicting norms, and we know that the homestead principle as 
a principle of justice cannot generate conflicting norms without ceasing to be 
a principle of justice. Hence the question is: according to the Blockian 
Proviso, might B have appropriated the middle stripe in the first place the 
way Kinsella wanted him to or not? The following reasoning provides us with 
the answer: 
1) because C invites A on land that is C’s rightful property, A has no duty 
toward C not to enter C’s land (this duty was extinguished by the 
invitation); A has liberty toward C to enter C’s property; 
2) because B is not the owner of C’s land and therefore does not have any 
rights to C’s land, A by definition cannot have any correlative duties 
toward B in connection with C’s land; 
3) because A has no correlative duties toward B in connection with C’s 
land, A also has no duty toward B not to enter C’s land. 
But 
4) because B is the owner of the middle stripe, A has a duty toward B not 
to enter B’s land; 
5) because there is no other way for A to enter C’s land than through B’s 
land, to enter C’s land is to enter B’s land; 
6) because A has a duty toward B not to enter B’s land, and to enter C’s 
land is to enter B’s land, therefore A has a duty toward B not to enter C’s 
land, which contradicts (3). 
Therefore, if there is no other way for A to enter C’s land than through 
B’s land, the Blockian Proviso says B may not appropriate in such a way in 
the first place, because it would give rise to contradictory norms (A would at 
the same time have liberty to enter C’s land and no liberty to enter C’s land). 
It is unimportant whether C’s land is C’s property or no one’s land. In both 
cases the same bagel problem arises. If, on the other hand, there are other 
means available for A to enter C’s land, the Blockian Proviso can identify no 
problems with conflicting rights and B might legitimately have homesteaded 
the middle stripe this way. This is so because point 5 in the above reasoning 
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would then not hold—that is, entering C’s land would not mean entering B’s 
land, and therefore A’s duty toward B not to enter B’s land and A’s liberty 
(no duty not to) toward B to enter C’s land would have different content and 
no conflict of norms would result. 
In light of the above argument, we are able to consider Kinsella’s 
further question: “in Block’s theory, if C dies, all of a sudden this confers to 
A an easement-over-B’s-land! How can this be?” Now, it is obvious that the 
Blockian Proviso does not lead to any such a result. Person B might not have 
homesteaded in the way he did in Kinsella’s thought experiment in the first 
place, since it would have generated conflicting rights, regardless of whether 
C’s land was unowned or owned by C. If C’s land was unowned, A would at 
the same time have no duty toward B (as a non-owner of C’s land) not to 
enter C’s land and would have a duty toward B (as an owner of B’s land) not 
to enter C’s land. But exactly the same would be the case if C’s land belonged 
to C. Then A would have no duty toward B (as a non-owner of C’s land) not 
to enter C’s land and would have a duty toward B (as an owner of B’s land) 
not to enter C’s land. Nothing would change upon the death of C in this 
respect and no easements would “all of a sudden” originate. If, on the other 
hand, B might have appropriated in the way he did (because there were other 
means for A to enter C’s land), he might have done so whatever the status of 
C’s land (owned or unowned), because it would never have been part of a 
bagel problem. Hence, the Blockian Proviso works perfectly here as a filter 
for conflicting norms and introduces no paradoxes at all. 
Kinsella (2007) writes, “As best I can understand it, Block’s 
‘forestalling’ conclusion seems to be incorrect. It would imply a general 
easement right over everyone’s property on behalf of everyone else if they 
‘need’ that property to ‘get to’ some other property they want to be on.” This 
is not the case, however. Kinsella’s point is a non sequitur. The Blockian 
Proviso precludes conflicting appropriation and only conflicting 
appropriation. Hence, no general easement right follows from the proviso. 
Person A is perfectly able to justly appropriate a parcel of land without 
granting easements to other people, provided such appropriation does not 
prevent other people from exercising their property rights—that is, from 
exercising their rights of exclusive control over their properties—because 
then and only then would we end up with the system of conflicting property 
rights. Thus, if A would like to appropriate land in such a way that would 
effectively prevent B from leaving B’s land and travelling to wherever B is 
allowed to move (unowned land, invitation to C’s property, etc.), the 
Blockian Proviso precludes such appropriation, and rightly so. But there is 
nothing whatever in the Blockian Proviso that would underwrite people’s need 
to travel. It is not about people’s needs, idiosyncrasies, or other subjective 
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feelings, but about the logic of the system of rights. If there is a logical 
contradiction among rights, duties, or liberties, the Blockian Proviso 
precludes appropriations that would give rise to such conflicts, even if no one 
on the planet would ever even think about appropriating in such a way. Some 
conflict-generating appropriations are logically unavailable for the homestead 
principle of justice, regardless of people’s need to wander about, or lack 
thereof. 
By the same token, Kinsella (2007) writes, “Block also seems to believe 
that if you own a circle of property and some people live in the territory 
inside the circle, you are ‘trapping’ them if you don’t let them use your 
property to ‘leave’ the circle. This comment seems to confirm my concerns 
about his view and how it could be generalized to some kind of ‘necessity-
easement’ not limited to the homesteading case.” But according to my 
interpretation of the Blockian Proviso, the problematic nature of owning 
such a circle of property does not depend on any further question about 
whether you happen to allow or deny people the only possibility of leaving 
the “trap.” You may not own bagel-shaped property, period. Why not? 
Because appropriating this way generates contradictory rights, regardless of 
how the putative rights-holders would like to exercise these apparent rights. 
We can now consider yet another interesting argument proposed by 
Kinsella, this time not so much to undermine it as to improve the Blockian 
Proviso itself. Kinsella (Long, 2007) asks, “Imagine the donut is owned by 
100 people. Cross [sic] any of their tracts gets him in or out. Which one does 
he have an easement over?” Setting aside again Kinsella’s assumption that the 
donut is lawfully owned, this is a good test of our interpretation of the 
Blockian Proviso. Block (2016, p. 34) answers, in my opinion, 
unsatisfactorily: “Our response: The same answer applies to the running back 
in football. He is faced with an entire defensive line; all of them are 
preventing him from reaching his goal, the end zone. Which of them shall he 
run through, over, between or around? The reply: anyone he chooses.” Yet 
why anyone he chooses? The first person among the hundred does not 
appropriate in a way that would generate any conflicting rights or prevent 
anyone from appropriating the hole in the donut-to-be—nor the second, 
third, fourth, and so on. Up to the hundredth person no conflict-generating 
appropriation takes place. On this assumption, the donut’s hole is still up for 
nonconflicting homesteading. Not allowing these ninety-nine persons to fully 
appropriate their parcels would indeed look like imposing on them a general 
positive duty to give an easement to others on demand. There is no 
principled reason to do so. Quite the contrary. Only the hundredth person 
appropriates in a way that would generate conflicting rights (for example, the 
same person has at the same time a duty not to enter the hole and no duty not 
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to enter the hole) and only this person may not therefore homestead in such 
a way. The Blockian Proviso would then prevent only the hundredth person 
from appropriating the donut-closing parcel. What might the hundredth 
person then do according to the Blockian Proviso? One of three things 
(although only the first one is available based on our assumption that it is the 
last parcel left and that the hundredth person wants to appropriate). First, he 
might appropriate the donut-closing parcel and the hole. Second, he might 
appropriate less than the donut-closing parcel. Third, he might desist.  
What if all one hundred persons appropriated their parcels 
simultaneously?6 Which one of these persons would then violate the Blockian 
Proviso? I would be inclined to answer: all of them. They would 
simultaneously generate conflicting duties on the part of a potential owner 
who would like to appropriate the hole in the center. Since according to the 
Blockian Proviso no one may appropriate in a way that generates conflicting 
duties, and because in the simultaneous appropriation all one hundred 
persons together generate conflicting duties, one must conclude that nobody 
successfully appropriates his parcel. In this scenario Block’s original answer 
seems valid: a potential owner may access the hole in the center by crossing 
any parcel he chooses since no parcel has been lawfully appropriated. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper I defended the Blockian Proviso against its critics and in 
the process interpreted it as a law of non-contradiction in the theory of 
property rights. My point is that the Blockian Proviso operates as a part of 
the homestead principle and therefore determines what may and what may 
not be originally appropriated. Being a part of the homestead principle, the 
purpose of the Blockian Proviso is to generate just, conflict-avoiding, 
consistent, rationally justified original property rights. It works well in this 
respect. If libertarians reject it, there is a risk they will no longer be able to 
talk about the homestead principle as the principle of justice. Without the 
Blockian Proviso, we would have to allow bagel-shaped appropriations, and 
we would end up with a system of norms that contradict the very purpose of 
norms: the avoidance of conflict. 
                                                          
6 An anonymous reviewer suggests this scenario is worth considering. 
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